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Abstract 
In this paper we consider how to design a national tradable quota system to reduce emissions of 
climate gases when the regulator is concerned about the survival of specific firms. The problem 
is studied using a two-period model with a stochastic price in the second period. This enables us 
to include the effects of a chosen design of the tradable quota system on irreversible investment 
in abatement technology. We look at the social cost of ensuring firm survival for different ways 
of allocating free quotas and for different assumptions of whether an investment in abatement 
technology is cost minimizing or not. 
 
Key Words: Environmental regulation, environment and technology, international 
environmental issues, tradable quotas, firm survival, climate policy. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Michael Hoel and Asbjørn Torvanger for their valuable comments. 
 iv 
 
 
 v 
 
 
Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
2 THE MODEL...........................................................................................................................5 
3 ALLOCATION RULES............................................................................................................9 
3.1 THE FLEXIBLE OPTION .............................................................................................................................9 
3.2 THE SEMI-FLEXIBLE OPTION ...................................................................................................................9 
3.3 THE FIXED OPTION....................................................................................................................................9 
3.4 THE ORDER OF THE PLAY.........................................................................................................................9 
4 THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT ALLOCATION RULES WHEN INVESTMENT IN 
ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY IS NOT COST-MINIMIZING ............................................... 11 
4.1 THE FLEXIBLE AND SEMI-FLEXIBLE OPTIONS....................................................................................11 
4.2 THE FIXED OPTION..................................................................................................................................11 
5 IMPACT OF DIFFERENT ALLOCATION RULES WHEN THE INVESTMENT IN 
ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY IS COST MINIMIZING ......................................................... 13 
5.1 THE FLEXIBLE OPTION ...........................................................................................................................14 
5.2 THE SEMI-FLEXIBLE OPTION .................................................................................................................15 
5.3 THE FIXED OPTION..................................................................................................................................17 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................. 21 
7 REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................23 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
CICERO Working Paper 2000:8 
National Climate Policy, Firm Survival, and Investments 
 
 
 1 
 
1 Introduction  
Emissions of climate gases and their effects on the global climate have been debated for many 
years both among scientists and within the community of nations. There is now a wide 
recognition of the necessity of international binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. In this regard, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change represents an important step towards regulating these emissions. The Kyoto 
Protocol requires the participating developed countries to reduce their collective emissions of six 
key greenhouse gases by 5.2% below 1990 levels during the period 20082012. Although the 
details have not yet been fully negotiated, the Kyoto Protocol also includes the possibility for the 
participating countries to reach their emissions goals through the use of several flexible 
mechanisms (the Kyoto mechanism), among them the possibility for emissions trading with 
other countries that have emission obligations under the treaty. The flexible mechanisms in 
general, and specifically the possibility of emissions trading among agents, are important 
instruments for reducing the costs of emissions abatement by allowing the parties to take cost-
effective actions. 
An international system of emissions trading will leave the choice open to each 
participating country of how to regulate greenhouse gas emissions domestically. However, there 
are advantages to combining an international tradable quota system with a national tradable 
quota system, and governments may thus be tempted to choose a tradable quota system at the 
domestic level (Bohm (1999) discusses this issue). 
A national quota trading system that fulfils the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol will 
imply a cost for most agents operating within the system because they will have to abate 
emissions and/or buy quotas. For some firms, the increasing cost following from the climate 
policy can result in a situation where further production is not profitable. These firms may find it 
profitable to close down their production. The government may wish to prevent a situation like 
this for two reasons. First, if production is closed down in a country with commitments to 
reduce emissions, the global emissions from these sources are not necessarily reduced, and may in 
fact be increased depending on the intensity of emissions in the production of these goods in 
countries not having emissions obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. (This is often referred to 
as the carbon-leakage problem).1 Second, survival of some firms may be important to social 
welfare because they are located in regions where the potential for establishing alternative 
businesses can be limited at least in the short run. This is probably the most important reason for 
individual governments to prevent domestic firms from closing down production. 
We consider a situation where the government in a specific country has signed an 
international agreement to reduce emissions of climate gases and that an international system of 
tradable quotas has been established.2 The government has elected to use tradable quotas on a 
national basis to reach the target agreed for the country. The relevant production decision for the 
firms we are considering is either to produce at the capacity level or to shut down production 
                                           
1 Several studies have focused on designing climate policy to reduce this problem. See for instance Golombek et. al 
(1995), Hoel (1996) and Mæstad (1998). 
 
2 This assumption is not crucial for the conclusions in this paper. We would get the same conclusions if only a 
national tradable quota system was established. 
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permanently.3 The government wants to secure the survival of the firms because of the 
employment following from production at the capacity level and/or the carbon-leakage 
consequences of firm closure.  We analyze the problem in a dynamic context to be able to also 
include the effects of selected design elements on investment decisions in abatement technology 
in these firms.  
We assume that the government in the country we are considering has decided to 
introduce an emissions-trading system domestically. All firms in this specific country must hold 
quotas corresponding to their emissions levels, and quotas can be bought on the international 
quota market. The government sells its initial endowments of quotas in accordance with the 
international agreement on the international market for quotas, except for the amounts allocated 
free of charge to firms where survival should be secured. These free quotas are allocated on a 
firm-specific basis contingent on continued production.4 In the discussion about the merits of 
using free quotas on a national basis it is normally assumed that the quotas are allocated on a 
general basis for instance by allocating quotas to firms based on historical emissions. Although 
simpler, a general allocation system is likely to be more costly since there will necessarily be a 
great deal of variation in the amount of free quotas required by each firm to secure survival. A 
general system thus runs risk of systematic over-allocation to some firms and allocating an 
insufficient amount of quotas to other firms. For this reason, this paper assumes firm-specific 
allocation.  
Free quotas as a policy instrument to ensure survival of firms has been studied in Jebjerg 
and Lando (1997) and Hagem (1998). The authors study the impact of allocating free quotas 
when the firm in question has private information about its abatement costs. They both show, 
with different assumptions about the abatement cost function, that designing a menu of different 
abatement contracts, from which the firm can choose, is welfare superior to distributing free 
quotas contingent on production.  
Several authors have addressed the issue of environmental policy and plant location. 
Markusen et al (1993 and 1995) analyze a model within the area of environmental policy where 
plant locations and market structures are endogenous. Their model demonstrates that plant 
location and market structure can be a function of environmental policy. Hoel (1997) follows up 
the studies by Markusen et al (1993 and 1995). He shows that in a game between the 
governments of two countries within this setting, each chooses its own environmental policy, 
and the Nash equilibria of the game are generally not Pareto-optimal. Hence, a coordination of 
environmental policy may be needed. The conclusion from Hoel (op.cit.) modifies the 
conclusion from Oates and Schwab (1988, 1996) that under certain assumptions, decentralization 
of emission taxes to the country level yields a Pareto-optimal outcome, so that there is no need 
for international coordination of emission taxes.5  
                                           
3 In many countries it is a concern that taxes on greenhouse gas emissions from emissions-intensive industry or 
auctioned emissions quotas will lead to a shut down of several production plants within that industry. Emissions-
intensive industries include manufacturing of metals, where characteristics of the production process are that the 
production capacity is given (in the short run), production involves a large fixed cost, and unit operating costs are 
constant. This implies that it is profitable for the firm either to produce at its full capacity, or to permanently or 
temporarily close down production.  
 
4 Free quotas distributed unconditionally, that is, not contingent on continued production, does not prevent a firm 
from closing down production. This is discussed inter alia in Frech (1973) and Hagem (1998). 
 
5 The assumptions of price-taking agents and small countries from the results obtained by Oates and Schwab (op 
cit.) are relaxed in the study by Hoel (op cit).  
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Several authors have also considered another element of our problem, namely the effects 
of environmental policy on investment in new technology.  Milliman and Prince (1989) consider 
firm incentives to promote technological change under five regulatory regimes: direct controls, 
emission subsidies, emission taxes, free marketable quotas, and auctioned marketable quotas. 
The process of technological change is broken into three basic steps: innovation, diffusion 
(facilitating the adoption of the new technology across firms), and optimal agency response 
(pressuring regulators to adjust pollution controls in response to these innovations). On a 
relative basis, taking into account all these steps, emission taxes and auctioned quotas provide 
the highest firm incentives to promote technological change; at times, free quotas generate lower 
incentives. Direct controls usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote 
technological change. Jung et al (1996) extend Milliman and Princes comparative approach from 
the firm to the industry level, and their rankings on the industry level are generally consistent 
with the firm-level findings of Milliman and Prince (op.cit.). 
In our paper we do not analyze the strategic element of environmental policy when 
market structures are endogenous, but consider only how the government in a specific country 
can ensure firm survival through the design of its environmental policy.  Further, we only 
consider one specific policy instrument, namely the allocation of free quotasmore specifically, 
how different systems for allocation of free quotas over time influence production and 
investment decisions. We look at the cost of ensuring firm survival under different systems of 
allocating free quotas and under different assumptions of whether an investment in abatement 
technology is cost minimizing or not. The next section presents the model used in the analysis. 
Section three describes the different designs of a national quota trading system that we are 
considering in this paper. Sections four and five compare different designs of a tradable quota 
system under different assumptions about the profitability of investment in different kinds of 
technology, and section six presents the conclusions of the paper. 
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2 The model 
We consider a situation where a government in a country has signed an international climate 
agreement to reduce emissions of climate gases. The climate agreement specifies a particular 
target of emissions reductions for the different signatories. The target is set for a finite time 
horizon, which we divide into two periods, period 1 and period 2. The government in the 
country we are considering has decided to reach the target by introducing an emissions trading 
system. We assume that an international quota market with a quota price of ti has been 
established, where i =1,2 indicate the period. The national firms must hold quotas corresponding 
to their emissions levels, and they are allowed to trade quotas on the international quota market. 
As stated in the introduction, the government sells its initial endowments of quotas according to 
the Kyoto Protocol on the international quota market, except for the amounts allocated free of 
charge to firms where survival should be secured. The government considers how to allocate the 
free quotas on a firm-specific basis to secure survival of these firms. In this paper we consider 
the implications of different allocation rules on production and investment decisions for one 
specific firm.  
The firm has a fixed production capacity and constant unit operating costs. The relevant 
production decision for the firm in question is either to produce the capacity output or to 
permanently close down production.  
Let xi denote the firms production in period i. Furthermore let the capacity output be 
normalized to 1. We assume that a temporary shutdown is not profitable for the firm, which 
means that if it is not profitable for the firm to produce in period 1, it will close down 
production permanently and hence not produce in period 2. Since we have assumed that it is 
always profitable for the firm to produce the capacity output if it chooses to not close down 
production, the different possible combinations of production in period 1 and 2 are hence   
}}1,1{},0,1{},0,0{{},{ 21 ∈xx   (1) 
Although the production capacity is fixed, we assume that the firm can reduce the 
emissions per unit output through investment in abatement technology. The firm decides if it is 
going to undertake this kind of investment in period 1. The emissions from the firm are 
dependent upon the level of production ex post and the technology (T) chosen by the firm 
)T,x(g ii =ε   (2) 
Here technology is given a wide interpretation. It could include both investments in 
abatement technology as well as investment in technological equipment that leads to a switch of 
energy source. (For simplicity we assume that a switch of energy source will not affect the 
production costs of the firm.) We assume proportionality between emissions and the level of 
production ex post. Further, investments in technology that reduces emissions from the firm are 
restricted to one project, denoted TV. The technology that is already in use by the firm is denoted 
T0. There are hence three possible outcomes for the firms emission levels, depending on 
whether the firm produces and the chosen technology:  
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==
       (3) 
Emissions resulting from the existing technology, T0, are greater than emissions 
following from investment in the new technology, TV, that is,  
)T(U)T(U 0V <          (4) 
The authorities, henceforth referred to as the regulator, observe the emissions from 
the firm. The regulator uses the distribution of free quotas as the policy instrument to prevent 
the firm from closing down production. Since the quotas are fully tradable on an international 
market for quotas, they can be considered a monetary subsidy. The subsidies are given as free 
quotas allocated to the firm for each of the two periods. Let Si denote the monetary value of the 
free quotas distributed in period i. The actual subsidies paid to the firm in each period are 
contingent on production.  We assume that the regulator does not set any other demands for the 
distribution of quotas than that the firm must produce the capacity output, which we have 
assumed is the profit-maximizing output for the firm if it chooses to continue production. The 
free quotas, Si, are given by  
1
10
==
<=
iii
ii
xforsS
xforS
         (5) 
Furthermore, let Di denote the short-run profit of the firm if it chooses to produce (the 
capacity output) in period i. The short-run profit of the firm in period i (Di) is given by 
iiiii sTUtcpD +−−= )(         (6) 
where pi is the output price of the firms product in period i, and ci is the production cost at the 
capacity level. It is assumed that all agents have perfect foresight about both c2 and t2 in period 1. 
However, p2 is assumed to be uncertain in period 1, and can either be high, with probability γ, or 
low with probability 1-γ (0≤γ≤1).6  A high level of p2 is denoted Hp2 , and a low level of p2 is 
denoted Lp2 . The division of p2 into two levels  high and low  is motivated by the influence of 
other countries national climate policy on the price level in period 2. If other countries 
participating in the climate agreement choose to subsidize their industries that are in danger of 
being closed down, p2 will have a low level. The opposite situation will give a high level of p2. It is 
assumed that without requirements of reducing emissions the firm will continue to produce the 
capacity output without any subsidies from the regulator. However, with requirements of 
emission reductions it is assumed that without a subsidy from the regulator in period 1 the firm 
will be closed down.  
If the firm chooses to produce in period 1 (x1=1), it will consider investing in technology 
TV instead of keeping the old technology T0 that results in higher emission levels. Throughout 
                                           
6 An uncertain c2 or t2 in our model leads to the same qualitative results as an uncertain p2. 
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the paper, we assume that the cost of investing in TV will not be covered by producing only in 
one period. Hence, 
[ ] 2,1i)T(U)T(UtqT V0iV =−>       (7) 
where q is the unit price of TV. The cost minimizing technology if the firm produces in only one 
period is therefore T0. We consider two different situations regarding the long-run impact on the 
firms cost of the investment in abatement technology if the firm produces in both periods. We 
refer to the investment in TV as a long-run cost minimizing investment if the following condition 
is satisfied:  
[ ] [ ] VVV qTTUTUtTUTUt ≥−+− )()()()( 0201      (8) 
Equation (8) is satisfied if the total cost reduction over both periods following from the 
investment is higher than the investment cost. The situation where (8) is satisfied is analyzed in 
section 5.  
If (8) is not satisfied, the existing technology T0 is the cost-minimizing technology also if 
the firm produces in both periods. This situation is analyzed in section 4. 
We assume that the firm is risk neutral. The firm will invest in TV if the expected long-
run profit (where long-run profit is denoted Π) from this investment is higher than the expected 
long-run profit earned with the technology T0, i.e.,  
[ ] 0)x,x,T(Max)x,x,T(MaxE 21021V ≥− ΠΠ      (9) 
The firm chooses the production in each period that maximizes the short-run profit 
given the investment decision in period 1.  The three possible outcomes of the production 
decision are given by (1).  
2222222
1111111
221111
),()(
),()(
),(),(),,(
STxtxcxp
SqTTxtxcxp
xTxTxxT
V
vV
VVV
+−−+
+−−−
=Π+Π=Π
ε
ε         (10) 
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0
222222
1
0
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2
0
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0
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0
),()(
),()(
),(),(),,(
STxtxcxp
STxtxcxp
xTxTxxT
+−−+
+−−
=Π+Π=Π
ε
ε      (11) 
We assume that the regulator wants to secure production in both periods both at a high 
and a low level of p2 by allocating the minimum amount of free quotas necessary to achieve this. 
As discussed earlier, the relevant production decision for the firm in our model is either to 
produce the capacity output or to shut down production. Thus, for the government, securing 
production means to secure production at the capacity level.  
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3 Allocation rules 
The regulator considers three different ways of allocating quotas (S1, S2) to the firm to secure 
production in both periods. The amount of free quotas distributed to the firm for period 1 is 
known to the firm at the beginning of period 1 under all allocation rules. The allocation rules 
differ regarding rules for allocating free quotas in period 2 if the firm continues production. 
Under all allocation rules, the amount of free quotas equals zero if the firm does not produce.  
3.1 The flexible option 
The amount of free quotas for period 2 is not announced by the regulator before the beginning 
of period 2, after the outcome of p2 has been observed. We denote the amount of free quotas 
under this allocation rule as 1~s  and 2~s . 
The firm expects that the amount of 2~s allocated, denoted 2s~E , is the amount that 
minimizes the amount of free quotas necessary to fulfill the regulators goals for production and 
investment by the firm for that period.    
 
3.2 The semi-flexible option 
The amount of free quotas allocated in period 2 is a function of p2. This function, denoted 
)(ˆ 22 ps  is announced to the firm at the beginning of period 1. The outcome of )(ˆ 22 ps  is known 
to the firm when the regulator learns about the price level in period 2. The amount of free 
quotas in period 1 under this allocation rule is denoted 1ˆs . The firms expected amount of 2sˆ  
allocated, denoted E 2sˆ , is 
)(ˆ)1()(ˆˆ 22222
LH pspssE γγ −+=  
3.3 The fixed option 
We denote the amount of free quotas under this allocation rule as 1s and 2s . The amounts of 
free quotas allocated for period 2 is a fixed amount, known with certainty in period 1. Hence 2s  
is independent of the outcome of p2. This means that the firms expected amount of 2s  allocated 
in period 2, denoted E 2s , is fixed and also that it is known in period 1. 
3.4 The order of the play 
The model described in section 2 above can be understood as a game between the regulator and 
the firm. The order of the play in this game is as follows: 
 
1. At the beginning of period 1, the regulator announces the allocation of quotas for period 
1 and which of the allocation rules, described above, that will be followed for period 2.  
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2. With this information available in period 1, the firm then decides whether or not to 
invest in TV and whether or not to continue to produce in that period. The firm will 
choose to invest if (9) is satisfied and the firm will choose to maintain production if 
0),( 11 ≥
jTsD  where j∈0,V       (12) 
)T,p(ss  ,)T,p(ss let Further equality.  with(12)
 equation fulfills that  sof amount required the denote )T,p( sLet
V
,1
D
1
2
1
0
,1
D
1
1
1
11
D
1
11
1
≡≡
   (13) 
3. At the beginning of period 2, p2 is observed, and under the flexible and the semi-flexible 
options, the regulator announces the amount of s2 that will be allocated to the firm in that 
period. 
4. On the basis of this information, the firm decides whether to continue production in 
period 2.  The firm will produce in period 2 if 
0),( 22 ≥
jTsD  where j∈0,V       (14) 
4
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
VH
2
D
2
4
2
VL
2
D
2
3
2
0H
2
D
2
2
2
0L
2
D
2
1
2
22
D
2
ssandss),T,(pss),T,(pss
),T,(ps s ,)T,(ps slet Further equality.  with(14)
 equation fulfills that  sof amount required the denote T),(p sLet
22
22
2
>>≡≡
≡≡   (15) 
Equations  (12) and (14) are henceforth referred to as the production constraints. 
Given this game, a regulator that wants to secure production in both periods will seek to 
minimize the total amount of free quotas necessary for firm survival because of the social costs 
of public funds. This implies that, given production in both periods, the regulator must ensure 
that the firm chooses to use the cost-minimizing technology. 
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4 The impact of different allocation rules when 
investment in abatement technology is not 
cost-minimizing 
In the following we consider the situation where the investment in TV is not cost minimizing 
even with production in both periods. Hence equation (8) will not be fulfilled, and in this case, 
the regulator prefers that the investment not be implemented. This implies that the production 
constraints given by equations (12) and (14) have to be satisfied given the use of technology T0. 
The regulator will only allocate the minimum amount of quotas necessary to achieve its goal, 
which implies that in period 1 it has to minimize (s1+Es2) given that (12) and (14) are satisfied.  
4.1 The flexible and semi-flexible options 
Under the flexible and semi-flexible options, the minimum amount of quotas that the regulator 
has to allocate to the firm in period 1 is given when equation (12) given T0 is satisfied with 
equality. However, in period 2 under the flexible option, the firm anticipates that when the 
regulator wants to ensure production it will choose a s2 that minimizes the cost of doing this, 
defined in equation (15) given T0. The outcome of s2 is thus the same as it is under the semi-
flexible option when the regulator seeks to minimize the amount of s2 paid given that (14) is 
satisfied for both outcomes of p2. The expected amount of s2 allocated to the firm under the 
flexible and the semi-flexible options is hence 
2
2
1
222 ss)1(s~EsˆE γγ +−==         (16)  
4.2 The fixed option 
Under this option, the regulator announces the amount of quotas allocated to the firm for both 
periods during period 1, and the amounts allocated in both periods are known with certainty to 
the firm. The minimum amounts of s1 and s2 that the regulator has to allocate to the firm in 
period 1 and period 2 to ensure production in these periods are given when the production 
constraints given by equations (12) and (14) given T0 are satisfied with equality. The amount of s1 
allocated is the same amount that is allocated to the firm under the flexible and the semi-flexible 
option. 
With uncertainty of p2 and when the regulator wants to ensure production for both 
outcomes of p2, the regulator has to pay the level of subsidies that leaves the firm with a short- 
term non-negative profit in period 2, even if p2 is low. Hence, 
1
22 ssE = . Without the possibility 
of taking into account the new information made available in period 2 about p2, subsidies must 
be paid such that if the worst case is realized, production is still profitable. The expected amount 
of s2 allocated under the fixed option )sE( 2  is hence higher than the expected amount  allocated 
under the flexible and the semi-flexible options (given by equation (16) ). 
 
The flexible and semi-flexible options will reduce the regulators’ expected costs of ensuring production in 
both periods compared to the fixed option when investment in TV is not cost minimizing. 
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5 Impact of different allocation rules when the 
investment in abatement technology is cost 
minimizing 
We now consider a situation where the regulator wants to secure production in both periods, 
both at a high and a low level of p2 and where TV is the cost-minimizing technology given that 
the firm produces in both periods, that is, that (8) is satisfied. This implies that the regulator 
must ensure that the expected total long-run profit from investing in TV is as profitable as the 
expected total long-run profit from keeping the old technology T0. To secure production in both 
periods for both outcomes of p2 given that the firm has invested in TV, the amount of s1 and s2 
allocated to the firm must fulfill the production constraint given by conditions (12) and (14) 
given TV. If the production constraints (12) and (14) are satisfied for TV the production pair 
{x1,x2} that maximizes )x,x,T( 21
VΠ is {1,1}. When (8) is satisfied, it is profitable for the firm 
to invest if it produces in both periods, that is, })1,1{,T(})1,1{,T( 0V ΠΠ ≥ . However, even 
though (8) is satisfied, it may be more profitable to keep the old technology and only produce in 
period 1, or to close down production, than to invest and produce in both periods. Hence, if the 
regulator ensures that (12) and (14) are satisfied, the expected total long-run profit from 
production in both periods with TV, is as profitable as the maximum expected total long-run 
profit from keeping the old technology, T0 if 
[ ] 0)}0,0,T(),0,1,T({Max)1,1,T(E 00V ≥− ΠΠΠ      (17) 
We henceforth refer to (17) as the investment-constraint.  
The regulator minimizes the amount of free quotas given to the firm contingent on 
production at the capacity level (s1, Es2) given that (12), (14), and (17) are satisfied.  
The amount of s1 determines whether it is most profitable for a firm that has not invested 
to produce in period 1 and close down in period 2, or to close down in period 1 (and hence 
receive zero profit). If (12) and (14) are satisfied and the amount of free quotas for period 1 (s1) 
is given by  
[ ] ,)T(U)T(Utss V0211 −+<        (18) 
the investment constraint is given by  
[ ] 0)0,0,T(where),0,0,T()1,1,T(E 00V ≡≥ ΠΠΠ      (19) 
If (12) and (14) are satisfied and the amount of free quotas for period 1 (s1) is given by 
 [ ])T(U)T(Utss V0211 −+≥ ,       (20) 
the investment constraint is given by  
[ ] 0)0,1,T(where),0,1,T()1,1,T(E 00V ≥≥ ΠΠΠ       (21) 
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It can be seen from (22) and (11) that the firms expected profit must be positive in order 
to ensure investment if s1 satisfies (20) with inequality. However, if s1 is given by (18), the firm 
can be left with zero profit in order to ensure investment (if (12) and (14) are satisfied). Hence, it 
is never optimal for the regulator to choose an amount of s1 that satisfies (20) with inequality. We 
will therefor in the following concentrate on the situation where s1 is given by (18) and the 
investment constraint is given by (19). (If s1 satisfies (20) with equality, the profit of producing in 
only period 1 equals zero and hence equals the profit of closing down production in period 1, 
that is, 0,0,T()0,1,T( 00 ΠΠ = )).  It should be noted that if s1 satisfies (20), an increase in s1 
increases the profit of non-investment with an equal amount.  
5.1 The flexible option 
In the flexible option, the regulator has not made any commitments regarding the allocation of 
free quotas in period 2. However, we have assumed that the regulator wants the firm to produce 
in both periods for both outcomes of p2. We also assume that the regulator wants to ensure 
production in both periods even if the firm has not invested, and that the firm knows this.7 The 
regulator observes the emissions in period 1 and can therefore deduce whether the firm has 
implemented the investment or not. The firm will anticipate that the amount of quotas received 
in period 2 will be sufficient to ensure profitable production. However, since the regulator seeks 
to minimize the total amount of quotas allocated, the firm correctly anticipates that the regulator 
chooses the minimum amount of quotas that ensures profitable production. Hence 
2s~E = )T,p(s
j
2
D
2
2  where )T,p(s j2
D
2
2 is defined in (15) The firms profit in period 2 will then 
equal zero, hence })1,1{,T(})0,1{,T( jj ΠΠ = .8  
If the amount of quotas allocated in period 1 ( 1s~ ) satisfies (18) and 2s~E = )T,p(s
j
2
D
2
2 , 
it can be seen from (10) and (11) that the investment constraint (17) is satisfied only if 
  
[ ])()( 101 VV TUtTUtqT −≤         (22) 
The above equation is not satisfied by assumption (see eq.(7)).  
In this paper, we consider a situation where the regulator is incapable of forcing the firm 
to produce in both periods or to implement the investment in TV. The regulator uses free quotas 
as the only mean to induce the firm to produce and implement the cost-minimizing investment. 
The quotas allocated to the firm in each period can be thought of as consisting of two parts. One 
part ensures profitable short-run production in each period, and the other covers a share of the 
investment cost. Hence, the investment cost can be partly covered through the free quotas in 
period 1 and partly covered by the free quotas in period 2. When the regulator has no binding 
commitments regarding the free quotas allocated in period 2, it is optimal for the regulator at the 
                                           
7 This assumption does not affect the conclusions (see footnote 8) since the firms expected profit in period 2 
equals zero, whether it has invested or not. 
 
8 Since the firms expected profit in period 2 equals zero whether it has invested or not, the firms investment 
decision is independent of whether the regulator wants to ensure production. The firms profit in period 2 cannot be 
less than zero even if the regulator does not want to ensure production since the profit of closing down production 
also equals zero.  
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beginning of period 2 to not allocate a larger amount of quotas than the amount necessary to 
ensure zero short-run profit in that period. Therefore, the amount of free quotas in period 2 
does not cover any part of the investment cost. As long as s1 satisfies (18) the total amount of 
quotas over both periods is not sufficient to ensure that the profit of investment is non-negative. 
The expected profit of investment is zero if s1 covers the entire investment cost in addition to 
ensuring zero short run profit. However, that will imply that s1 satisfies (20) with inequality and 
the maximum profit of non-investment will be positive and larger than the profit of investment. 
An increase in s1 will not ensure investment since the profit of non-investment will increase by 
the same amount (as discussed in the previous section). This leads to the following conclusion: 
 
If the regulator does not make any commitments regarding the free quotas distributed in period 2, the 
firm will never implement the investment. The firm will correctly anticipate that the free quotas distributed in 
period 2 will only cover the short-run profit and not any of the investment cost. The regulator cannot induce the 
firm to invest by distributing free quotas in period 1 sufficiently to ensure that the expected profit of investment is 
non-negative, since this will make it more profitable to not invest and produce only in period 1.  
5.2 The semi-flexible option  
In contrast to the flexible option, the semi-flexible option implies that the regulator has made 
commitments in period 1 regarding the allocation of quotas in period 2. We will in the following 
consider whether, and under what conditions, this system can induce the firm to invest in TV and 
produce in both periods. 
As discussed above, the regulator will seek to minimize the necessary total amount of 
free quotas allocated to the firm ( 1ˆs and )p(sˆ 22 ) to ensure production in both periods and 
investment in TV. The minimum value of 1ˆs , which ensures production in period 1 given that 
the firm has invested in TV, is 21s , defined in (13).  
The minimum values of )p(sˆ 22  that ensure production in period 2 for both outcomes 
of p2 given that the firm has invested in TV is
3
2s if 
L
22 pp = and 
4
2s if 
H
22 pp =  (
3
2s and 
4
2s are 
defined in (15)).  
As discussed in the previous section, s1 given by (20) will only make the profit of non-
investment positive and hence increase the regulators cost of ensuring investment. We will 
hence in the following only consider the situation where 1sˆ  satisfies (12) and (18), and the 
investment constraint is hence given by (19).  
When (12) and (18) is satisfied , 1sˆ is given by  
[ ] 10)T(U)T(Utssˆ v01211 <≤−⋅+= αα    
where t1(U(T0)-U(TV) is the emission costs following from using technology T0 instead of TV. As 
long as the regulator sets α<1, these extra emission costs will not be fully covered by the 
allocation of free quotas in period 1. Hence, it will never be profitable for the firm to produce 
without investing in TV.  
In order to find the minimum amount of ( [ ])p(sˆEsˆ 221 + ) that ensures that (17), (12) 
and (14) are satisfied, we find the amounts of )p(sˆ H22 and )p(sˆ
L
22 that ensure that (19) is 
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satisfied with equality, given that 1sˆ satisfies (12) and (18), and later check whether this solution 
also ensures that (14) is satisfied.  
It can be seen from (10) (which defines the long-run profit for the firm over both 
periods with TV) that when the firm produces in both periods, (19) is satisfied with equality if  
[ ] [ ] VV22L2H2V111
L
22
H
221
qT)T(Utc)p)1(p()T(Utcp
)p(sˆ)1()p(sˆsˆ
+−−−+−−−−
=−++
γγ
γγ
       (23) 
Inserting for 21s , 
3
2s and 
4
2s  into (23) leads to the following solution for the expected 
amount of quotas that leads to zero expected profit of investment in TV: 
[ ] V324221L22H221221 qTs)1(ss)p(sˆ)1()p(sˆsˆ)p(sˆEsˆ +−++=−++=+ γγγγ  
Let '1sˆ , )p(sˆ
H
2
'
2 and )p(sˆ
L
2
'
2 denote the amounts of free quotas that minimize the total 
expected amount of quotas allocated to the firm ( [ ])p(sˆEsˆ 221 + ) given that '1sˆ satisfies (12) and 
(18).  
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] 10,qT)T(U)T(Uts)p(sˆ
qT)T(U)T(Uts)p(sˆ
)T(U)T(Utssˆ
Vv0
1
4
2
H
2
'
2
Vv0
1
3
2
L
2
'
2
v0
1
2
1
'
1
<≤+−⋅−=
+−⋅−=
−⋅+=
αα
α
α
    (24)
  
It can be seen from (24) and (7) that )p(sˆ H2
'
2 > 
4
2s and )p(sˆ
L
2
'
2 >
3
2s . (The production 
restriction given by (14) is hence satisfied). This leads to the following conclusion: 
 
The regulator’s commitments regarding the allocation of free quotas for period 2 under the semi-flexible 
option must give the firm an expected positive short-run profit in period 2 when the regulator wants to ensure 
investment. The expected short-run profit, given that the firm has invested, must be positive and larger (or equal) 
to the investment cost minus the cost savings of the investment in period 1 in order to make it more profitable for 
the firm to invest than to keep the old technology.  
 
Note that under the flexible option discussed in the previous section, the firm did not 
invest since the expected short-run profit in period 2 equaled zero.  
Furthermore, since the amount of quotas characterized by  (24) is found be setting 
[ ] 0)1,1,T(E V =Π , we can conclude the following: 
 
The fact that the firm has the possibility of achieving free quotas in period 1 and closing down in period 2 
does not increase the regulator’s cost of ensuring investment and production in both periods. Hence, the minimum 
total amount of quotas that ensure that the expected profit of the investment is non-negative is sufficient to ensure 
that the firm implements the investment, but demands a certain distribution of quotas over time. The share of the 
free quotas that are allocated in period 1 must not be too large compared to the share allocated in period 2. 
CICERO Working Paper 2000:8 
National Climate Policy, Firm Survival, and Investments 
 
 
 17 
 
5.3 The fixed option 
As for the semi-flexible allocation rule, the fixed allocation rule implies that the regulator has 
made commitments in period 1 regarding the allocation of quotas in period 2. The allocation of 
quotas for period 2 is a fixed amount independent of the outcome of p2 and observed emissions, 
but allocated contingent on continued production.  
As with the other allocation rules, the regulator will seek to minimize the necessary total 
amount of free quotas allocated to the firm ( 1s and 2s ) to ensure production in both periods 
and investment in TV. The minimum value of 1s , that ensures production in period 1 given that 
the firm has invested in TV, is 21s , defined in (13).  
The minimum value of 2s , that ensures production in period 2 for both outcomes of p2 
given that the firm has invested in TV, and hence ensures that (14) is satisfied for T=TV, is 32s , 
defined in (15).  
In order to find the regulators optimal choice of 1s and 2s , we find the amount of 2s  
that gives [ ] 0)1,1,T(E V =Π , given that 1s satisfies (12) and (18) and later check whether the 
solution to 2s  satisfies (14). This leads to the following 
 
[ ]
[ ] 10),pp()T(U)T(UtqTss
)T(U)T(Utss
L
2
H
2
v0
1
V3
2
'
2
v0
1
2
1
'
1
<≤−−−⋅−+=
−⋅+=
αγα
α
     (25) 
where '1s and 
'
2s  denote the amounts of free quotas that minimize the total expected amount of 
quotas allocated to the firm ( [ ]21 sEs + ) given that '1s satisfies (12) and (18). 
The production constraint (14) is satisfied for both outcomes of p2 if 
3
22 ss ≥ . Let B 
denote the term [ ])pp(qT L2H2V −−γ . When B ≥0, there exists an α, 0≤ α < 1, that implies that 
equations (14) and (25) can be satisfied. However, when B<0, (14) will not be satisfied for any α, 
0≤ α < 1, when '2s  is given by equation (25). Hence, in the following we will examine the 
solution for '1s and 
'
2s , depending on whether B is negative or non-negative. 
 
5.3.1 B is non-negative  [ ])pp(qT L2H2V −≥ γ  
When B ≥0, the minimum amount of 1s and 2s  that ensures that (17), (12) and (14),are satisfied, 
denoted *1s and 
*
2s , are given by  
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] })T(U)T(Ut
)pp(qT,1{Min0
and
),pp()T(U)T(UtqTss
)T(U)T(Utss
v0
1
L
2
H
2
V
L
2
H
2
v0
1
V3
2
*
2
v0
1
2
1
*
1
−
−−
<≤
−−−⋅−+=
−⋅+=
γ
α
γα
α
   (26) 
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The solution to *1s and 
*
2s  given by (26) satisfies the production constraints and ensures 
that the expected long-run profit of the investment in TV is zero  When B ≥0, we get the same 
conclusion as under the semi-flexible system:  
 
The minimum total amount of quotas that ensure that the expected profit of the investment is non-
negative is sufficient to ensure that the firm implements the investment, but demands a certain distribution of 
quotas over time.   
 
We concluded in section 3 that when the investment is not cost-effective, the semi-
flexible system is less costly than the fixed system. However, when the investment in TV is cost 
minimizing, this conclusion no longer holds when B≥ 0.  
 
The fact that the amount of free quotas for period 2 is fixed in period 1 and independent of the outcome 
of p2 does not necessarily increase the regulator’s cost compared to a situation where the amount of quotas for period 
2 is a function of the outcome of p2. Both allocation rules may leave the firm with zero expected long-run profit and 
hence lead to the same expected minimum amount of quotas necessary to ensure investment and production in both 
periods.  
  
It should be noted that even though the two different allocation rules leave the firm with 
identical expected profit, the realized profit will differ. The fixed option implies that the firm will 
have a positive profit if the outcome of p2  is Hp2 , whereas the profit will be negative if the 
outcome is Lp2  . The semi-flexible allocation option ensures that the firms profit is zero for 
both outcomes of p2.  We have in this paper considered a risk-neutral firm. However, if the firm 
in question is risk averse, it will demand a risk premium in order to invest under the fixed option. 
In that case, the firms expected profit must be positive under the fixed option in order to induce 
the firm to invest.  
 
5.3.2 B is negative  ))pp(qT( L2H2V −< γ  
With B<0, we see that '1s and 
'
2s given by (26) are not sufficient to satisfy (14) for any α, 0≤α< 1. 
Hence, the amount of free quotas that is sufficient to ensure that the expected profit of the 
investment is positive, is not sufficient to ensure that the firm produces in both periods. In this 
case, the production constraints (14) will be the binding constraints. 
When B <0, the minimum amount of 1s and 2s  that ensures that (17), (12) and (14), are 
satisfied, denoted *1s and 
*
2s ,are given by  
3
2
*
2
2
1
*
1
ss
ss
=
=
          (27) 
where 32
2
1  and ss are defined in equation (13) and (15). The expected profit of the investment is 
greater than zero, and the firm will get a positive expected profit equal to -B. (Observe that 
*
1s and 
*
2s  given by (27) satisfy the investment constraint given by (17)). 
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The fixed amount of quotas allocated in period 2 ( 2s ) must be sufficient to ensure 
production also for a low level of p2. When B <0, the amount of quotas that ensure profitable 
production in period 2 more than offsets the minimum amount of quotas that ensure that the 
investment in TV is cost minimizing. Hence, as in the case where the investment is not cost 
minimizing, (discussed in section 4), the lack of the possibility for taking into account new 
information about p2, increases the regulators cost.  
It follows from the definition of B and the discussion above that: 
 
The smaller investment cost, the higher probability for H2p , and the larger the range for the possible 
outcomes of p2, the higher the probability is that the fixed system will be more costly than the semi-flexible system. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have considered a situation where a country has signed an international 
agreement to reduce emissions of climate gases. Their obligations are met by implementing a 
national tradable quota system. The question analyzed is how to design the tradable quota system 
when the regulator in the country we are considering is concerned about the survival of specific 
firms. The problem is studied within a two-period model to be able to include the effects of a 
chosen design of the tradable quota system on the firms decision to invest in abatement 
technology.  
To ensure survival of specific firms over the two periods, quotas are allocated for free on 
a firm-specific basis. We consider a situation where the output price of the firms product in 
period 2 is uncertain. The period 2 price is assumed to be either high or low with a certain 
probability distribution. Three different tradable quota systems are studied in the paper: 
 
• The flexible option, where it is only the amount of free quotas allocated in period 1 that is 
known to the firm.  
• The semi-flexible option, where the amounts of free quotas allocated in period 2 is a 
function of the price level in that period, and that this function is known to the firm in 
period 1. The firm also knows the amount of free quotas allocated for period 1 with 
certainty.  
• The fixed option, where the firm knows the amounts of free quotas allocated in the two 
periods with certainty in the first period. 
 
We assume that the regulator wants to secure the firms production in both periods. 
Further, we compare the different systems under assumptions of whether an investment in 
abatement technology that can be made by the firm is cost minimizing or not. We show that 
 
• when the investment in abatement technology is not cost minimizing, all allocation rules 
fulfill the regulators preferences about production and investment decisions. However, 
when the investment in new technology is cost minimizing, the flexible option will, within 
the model studied here, lead to a situation where the investment in abatement technology is 
not undertaken. The reason for this is that the firm expects that it will receive quotas in 
period 2 that will only cover production costs, and not any of the investment costs. It is not 
possible to allocate the total required amount of free quotas in period 1 because of the risk 
that the firm will take the subsidy and choose not to invest.  
• when it comes to ranking the various allocation rules with respect to the total amount of 
free quotas allotted to an agent, there is a difference between a situation where the 
investment in abatement technology is cost minimizing and when it is not. When the 
investment is not cost minimizing, the flexible and semi-flexible options reduce the 
regulators expected costs of fulfilling its preferences about production and investment 
decisions compared to the fixed option. When the investment in new technology is cost 
minimizing, the total expected costs of fulfilling the regulators preferences about 
production and investment decisions under the fixed and semi-flexible options may under 
certain conditions be equal. However, it is more likely that the semi-flexible option leads to 
lower expected costs than the fixed option; the lower the investment costs are, the higher 
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the difference between the two outcomes of the stochastic period 2 price, and the higher the 
possibility of a high period 2 price.  
 
In this paper we have assumed that the regulator demands only that the firm continue 
production in order to receive the free quotas. However, if the regulator also can make demands 
on investment in TV before it distributes the free quotas, investment will be ensured. A 
justification for our assumption is, first, that it may not be politically feasible to interfere with the 
firms choice of technology, and second, that the firms investment may not be observable for 
the regulator. 
When the regulator cannot/does not allocate quotas contingent on investment, a 
credibility problem with the fixed and semi-flexible options may arise when the investment in 
abatement technology is cost minimizing. If there is a credibility problem, the same situation as 
under the flexible system may occur. If the regulator does not pay all the subsidies necessary to 
make the firm invest in TV and continue production in period 1, the firm will believe that in 
period 2 the regulator will minimize the necessary subsidies paid to get the firm to produce in 
that period given the investment decision made in period 1. This implies that both under the 
fixed and semi-flexible options it will believe that when period 2 arrives, the subsidies paid under 
the flexible option will be realized, and as a result no investments in TV will be made. As shown 
in the paper however, the problem cannot be resolved by subsidizing the total required amount 
of free quotas to make the firm produce and invest in TV in period 1, for the reason discussed 
above. By doing so, the regulator runs the risk that the firm will take the subsidy and choose to 
not invest. 
The problem analyzed in this paper is discussed within a finite time horizon divided into 
two periods. However, the results obtained would not change if we introduced more than two 
periods. The free quotas must still be allocated so that production is secured in each period and 
that the investment is made in period 1. 
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